Your agent does not need direct internet access to reach the internet. It only needs one service around it that does. That was one lesson from @OpenAI's Hugging Face incident. Agents used an internal package service as a message board, then used that same path to reach outward. Shared storage became communication. One reachable service became a bridge to more infrastructure. @trailofbits pushed the same idea from another angle. GPT-5.6-Cyber escaped a QEMU/KVM VM three times. The takeaway is not “use better prompts.” It is: stop treating prompts, containers, or VMs as the security boundary. > Separate behavior rules from hard permissions > Assume the sandbox or VM can be compromised > Remove unnecessary interfaces and host access > Treat isolation as an end-to-end network property > Make every workload credential low-value This article is worth reading if you are building agents with tools, code execution, cloud access, or long-running tasks. The core question is no longer whether the agent follows instructions. It is what the surrounding system still prevents after the agent stops following them. Full breakdown ↓↓

The practical security question is not whether the sandbox blocks the internet. It is what every service reachable from that sandbox can reach next. https://t.co/WOEd8RYRQo
An with no internet access still reaches the internet through any reachable service that has it. Treat isolation as an end to end network property and keep every workload credential low value.
postShieldstral follows your policy but not your exceptions
postWe put $2,500 on the first person who could get a pizza delivered to the room by
postYour agent can find the policy, understand it, and still violate it. That happen
postIf your incident response path is pasting logs into a frontier commercial API, iChecking sign-in…
Loading comments…